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THE CONSUMERIZATION OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION
HELEN A. GARTEN *
As deregulation proceeds, consumer protection may become the sole
remaining rationale for any ongoing government involvement in financial
markets. Decades ago, in the name of safety and soundness, government
regulators enforced legal barriers between banks, securities firms, and
insurance companies. Now, as these barriers are being dismantled, the
regulatory function is shifting as well, as regulators increasingly concentrate
on fashioning consumer protection standards to govern the deregulated and
diversified financial institution. A new rule of regulation is emerging:
Regulatory intervention is necessary to the extent that financial institutions
have the potential to deal unfairly with the public. Otherwise, market controls
usually are adequate.1
Consumer protection is a serious concern in financial markets, where
information asymmetries are common and, as financial products become
more complex, levels of sophistication between suppliers and consumers
may diverge. This is especially true in U.S. financial markets, where direct
participation by individuals is significant. Equality of access to financial
services is an important norm and, in some cases, an explicit goal of U.S.
financial regulatory policy.2 Nevertheless, while the need for consumer
protection in financial markets is apparent, the assumption that consumer
protection provides the primary justification for regulating financial markets
is not. Moreover, that assumption is fueling a regulatory strategy that is likely
to be inefficient and even counterproductive.
This Essay explores these issues. Part I shows how consumer protection is
* Professor of Law, Rutgers-Newark. I presented an earlier version of this Essay at a
conference sponsored by the Merrill Lynch Center for the Study of International Financial Services
and Markets, Frank G. Zarb School of Business, Hofstra University.
1. This view has been endorsed by, among others, Nobel Prize-winning economist Merton
Miller. See Hooked on Financial Red Tape: Banking Industry Regulation, ECONOMIST, July 22, 1995,
at 65 (quoting Merton Miller, “There is no justification at all for regulating wholesale markets.”).
Regulators may protest that preventing systemic risk must always be their primary responsibility,
especially in deregulated wholesale markets. As this Essay argues, however, deregulation has
narrowed regulatory discretion both to define systemic risk and to use systemic risk to justify
government intervention in wholesale markets. See infra Part I.C (describing changes in bank failure
policy that make bank bailouts less likely). It remains to be seen whether financial regulators still have
the tools and political authority to deal with a true systemic crisis.
2. See, e.g., Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994) (stating intent of
Congress to require regulated financial institutions to meet needs of their communities for banking
services).
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becoming the leading rationale for financial regulation. This shift in
regulatory emphasis represents a departure from the past, when the desire for
financial stability frequently trumped consumer protection. For example,
bank regulators traditionally resisted full disclosure of negative financial
information in order to avoid adverse investor reaction that could result in
bank failure.3 In contrast, recent financial regulatory initiatives have sought
to correct information asymmetries and other customer abuses, such as
conflicts of interest and tying arrangements, that injure bank customers rather
than the bank itself.
Part II argues that the consumerization of financial regulation may distort
analysis of the costs and benefits of regulation, leading to the inefficient
production of regulation. In a few cases, consumerization provides too
simplistic a rationale for deregulation, especially when consumer benefits are
indirect and difficult to quantify. In other cases, consumerization means
overregulation, increasing the cost of operating in retail markets and
potentially denying retail customers the advantages of competition and
innovation in financial services enjoyed by wholesale customers.
Part III assesses the effect of the consumerization of regulation on the
regulators themselves. Increasingly, financial regulators are called upon to
create and enforce rules of conduct governing the offering and sale of
financial products, ranging from uninsured money market funds to complex
derivatives. Although such rules may be desirable, the question then arises
whether financial regulators are the most efficient providers of those rules.
Further, the ability of the regulators to enforce consumer rules is problematic,
particularly in today's deregulated financial environment.
I. THE RISE OF CONSUMERISM
Historically, safety and soundness rather than consumer protection were
the principal articulated goals of most financial regulation, particularly of the
law governing banks. Although, in theory, safety and soundness and
consumer protection are not inconsistent,4 bank regulation was characterized
by many examples of safety and soundness rules that, deliberately or
accidently, were anticonsumer in effect. For example, until relatively
recently, federal Regulation Q imposed ceilings on the interest rates that
banks could pay depositors.5 These ceilings originally were designed to
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1,
11 (1976) (soundness regulation protects financial firm’s public suppliers of capital).
5. The Federal Reserve’s authority to cap interest rates was provided by the Banking Act of
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p287 Garten.doc 07/27/99   10:52 AM
1999] THE CONSUMERIZATION OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 289
protect the banking industry from dangerous (to the banks) overcompetition
for deposits.6 They also were intended to discourage small banks from
maintaining their liquid reserves in the form of interest-bearing deposits at
their correspondent banks, a practice that was thought to increase interbank
exposure and systemic risk.7
These motives for interest rate regulation are more accurately
characterized as safety and soundness related than as consumer related,
although consumers as a group may have indirectly benefited from efforts to
strengthen the banking industry.8 Consumers, however, were directly harmed
by a rule that prevented them from earning market rates of interest on their
savings. Eventually, as unregulated alternatives such as money market
mutual funds became available,9 retail depositors defected,10 forcing
Congress and the regulators to dismantle most of Regulation Q’s ceilings.11
Even when regulation benefited consumers, consumer protection was
usually tangential to its main goal of preventing systemic risk. Further, the
administration of regulation tended to emphasize safety and soundness
concerns over consumer goals. For example, federal insurance of bank
deposits appears to be primarily consumer legislation, but protecting the
small depositor has always been at best a secondary goal. The primary goal
1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 162, 181-82 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 371b
(1994)). The Act also banned the payment of any interest on demand deposits. Regulation Q, the
Federal Reserve’s implementing regulation, was found at 12 C.F.R. § 217. Regulation Q is no longer
in effect.
6. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, at 443-45 (1963) (citing historical view that payment of interest on
deposits led to “excessive” competition among banks, forcing them to reduce reserves and engage in
risky investment policies).
7. In the 1920s these interbank deposits were often invested in callable brokers’ loans that were
used to fund securities speculation. When the depositing banks withdrew their funds, brokers’ loans
had to be liquidated and the underlying securities sold, thus increasing stock market volatility.
According to the Federal Reserve, the 1933 Banking Act’s ban on the payment of interest on demand
deposits was expected to slow the flow of interbank deposits into the call-loan market. See BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., A REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF FEDERAL MARGIN
REGULATION 133-34 (1984). Once the prohibition took effect, interbank balances declined
significantly. See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 444.
8. This is not to say that interest rate regulation was particularly effective in strengthening the
banking industry or that its implementation was not due in whole or in part to successful lobbying by
bankers for regulatory favors. Consumer protection, however, was not the primary motive.
9. The first money market mutual fund began offering shares to the public in 1972. See Timothy
Q. Cook & Jeremy G. Duffield, Money Market Mutual Funds and Other Short-Term Investment Pools,
in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 158 (6th ed.
1986).
10. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, as market interest rates rose above the Regulation Q
ceilings, money market mutual fund assets rose from $4 billion to $235 billion. See id. at 158-59.
11. In the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Congress
mandated a six-year phaseout of interest rate ceilings on time (savings) deposits. Pub. L. No. 96-221,
§ 204, 94 Stat. 132, 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1982)). As of 1998 the statutory prohibition on
the payment of interest on demand deposits remained in place, although repeal was considered.
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of federal deposit insurance was to maintain the stability of the banking
system, and this goal has shaped how the insurance scheme has been
implemented.
The history of deposit insurance suggests that the intended beneficiaries
were the banks themselves, especially small local institutions that were
struggling to win back reluctant retail depositors during the Depression.12
That the architects of deposit insurance had institutional rather than consumer
goals in mind is demonstrated by their willingness to insure both small and
large depositors. Without insurance, large depositors presumably would have
protected themselves by identifying the safest banks (or nonbanks) to hold
their funds. This market discipline would have penalized those banks,
typically smaller and less diversified, that were considered the most risky,
leading to more bank closings, which was exactly what policymakers were
determined to prevent.13 Thus, under the original $5000 insurance ceiling put
in place in 1934, 98.5% of all deposit accounts were insured in full.14
Moreover, the deposit insurance scheme historically has been
administered to promote bank stability rather than consumer protection.
Under the FDIC’s controversial “too big to fail” policy, the agency employed
deposit insurance resources to prevent the closing of large banks such as
Continental Illinois whose failure threatened the safety of fellow
institutions.15 Under this policy, deposit insurance coverage depended on the
economic significance of the bank rather than the consumer’s need for
protection. When a bank thought to be too big to fail was rescued by
12. See Helen A. Garten, A Political Analysis of Bank Failure Resolution, 74 B.U. L. REV. 429
(1994); Carter H. Golembe, The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of Its
Antecedents and Its Purposes, 76 POL. SCI. Q. 181 (1960). Ironically, in the 1930s few banks
considered themselves beneficiaries of deposit insurance legislation. Small and large banks had
different objections to the legislation, and these differences may have fractured organized industry
opposition, which otherwise might have defeated the legislation. See Garten, supra, at 449-58.
13. There is another reason to conclude that the goal of deposit insurance was to protect banking
institutions rather than consumers. In the early 1930s some policymakers suggested that legalizing
nationwide bank branching would provide an alternative to federal deposit insurance since national
(and nationally-regulated) bank chains were more financially stable than less diversified independent
local banks. Congressional supporters of a local banking system preferred deposit insurance. See
Golembe, supra note 12, at 198-99.
14. See Garten, supra note 12, at 453 (citing 1934 FDIC ANN. REP. 61). As originally designed,
insurance coverage was to be even more generous, covering all deposits up to $10,000 and a portion of
deposits over $10,000. See id. at 453 & n.127. The deposit insurance ceiling now stands at $100,000,
higher than necessary to protect small depositors.
15. For a chronology of the Continental Illinois bailout, see IRVINE H. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT: AN
INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF BANK FAILURES AND RESCUES 149-99 (1986). Under federal banking law, the
FDIC had broad statutory authority to provide “open bank assistance” to failing institutions when the
stability of large numbers of insured banks or of insured banks with significant resources were
threatened. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1) (1994).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/2
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government intervention, all of its depositors and other creditors were
protected, regardless of their financial sophistication or legal entitlement to
insurance.16
Even apart from the too big to fail policy, considerations that have
nothing to do with consumer protection traditionally have driven bank failure
resolution. The FDIC’s mandate was (and is) to resolve bank failure at the
lowest possible cost to the insurance fund.17 In the past, if the FDIC could
find a buyer for the failed bank’s franchise, the agency usually determined
that selling the bank cost less than liquidating its assets. In most cases the
buyer was eager to assume both the insured and uninsured deposits.18
Because few banks were liquidated, uninsured depositors rarely suffered the
uncertainty and risk of loss associated with bank liquidation.19 Moreover,
large sophisticated depositors found ways to guarantee themselves insurance
protection regardless of regulatory disposition. For example, large depositors
would use brokers to break up their investments into fully insured $100,000
pieces.20 As a result, virtually every depositor enjoyed protection from loss in
the event of bank failure.21
Deposit insurance is not the only example of regulation that was designed
with banks rather than their customers in mind. The Glass-Steagall Act,22
which barred banks from the securities business, was adopted in 1933 at a
time when concerns were voiced about protecting the investing public,
particularly retail depositors who had been persuaded by their banks to
speculate in the stock market.23 Nevertheless, Glass-Steagall’s prohibition on
16. See Helen A. Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1159, 1164 (1989).
17. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4).
18. See John F. Bovenzi & Arthur J. Murton, Resolution Costs of Bank Failures, 1 FDIC
BANKING REV. 1, 2 (1988). Until the 1980s virtually all bank failures were handled through this
purchase and assumption procedure. See Garten, supra note 16, at 1164.
19. Until the 1980s, even in liquidation, uninsured creditors recovered most or all of their
investments. According to FDIC statistics, as of the end of 1983, 99.1% of depositors in failed banks
were repaid in full. See Garten, supra note 16, at 1164 n.29.
20. In 1991 Congress tried to discourage this practice by limiting the interest payable on deposits
placed by brokers. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, § 302, 105 Stat. 2236, 2345 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(e) (1994)).
21. The exceptions were depositors large enough to have accounts over $100,000,
unsophisticated enough to be unable to exploit state-of-the-art risk management techniques, and
unlucky enough to have deposits in a bank that no one wanted to save. For example, payroll depositors
and other “involuntary” depositors who could not easily change banks might suffer a loss because they
did not have complete protection. See Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors
To Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 134-39 (1986).
22. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (seventh), 78, 377-378 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
23. The Pecora hearings on stock market abuses, conducted by a Senate subcommittee in 1933-
34, highlighted abusive sales tactics by the large retail brokerage arms of commercial banks. See
FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH: THE STORY OF OUR MODERN MONEY CHANGERS
84-104 (1939). These hearings may have influenced congressional deliberations on the Glass-Steagall
Act in the months leading to its passage in June 1933, but other more significant forces were also at
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virtually any bank involvement in the securities business was far more
sweeping than what would have been required to protect consumers from
unfair sales practices. Moreover, during congressional debate, critics of
Glass-Steagall warned that the Act would actually hurt small businesses,
local governments, and individual investors who had been the clients of bank
securities divisions.24 Thus, the original goals of Glass-Steagall appear to
have been institutional, protecting the banking industry from the volatility of
the stock market and from the competition from nonbank financial firms.25
It would be an exaggeration to conclude that bank regulation and bank
regulators were actively hostile to consumer interests. In fact, a compelling
argument can be made that strengthening the banking industry benefits the
consumer who relies on her bank for essential services. Yet what is good for
the banking industry is not always good for the banking customer, who
occasionally needs protection from her own bank. The Federal Government
responded to this need by adopting fair lending and consumer credit laws,26
but these rules dealt with discrete lending problems and, with one notable
exception, were administered separately from traditional soundness
regulation.27 Moreover, bank regulators interpreted national banking laws to
work. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
24. Populist proponents of easy money feared that Glass-Steagall would exacerbate the credit
crunch by taking banks out of the underwriting business. See Walter Lippmann, To-day and To-
morrow—The Glass Bill, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Jan. 29, 1932, reprinted in 75 CONG. REC. 2987 (1932).
Senator Huey Long charged that Glass-Steagall would prevent the “people’s banks” from selling
bonds, leaving local governments and small businesses at the mercy of Wall Street investment
bankers. 76 CONG. REC. 1460 (1933) (statement of Sen. Long). The U.S. Chamber of Congress argued
that banks had opened the securities markets to the small investor and disputed the suggestion that
banks had foisted worthless securities on retail customers, maintaining that “the best interests of the
investing public are served by commercial banks.” 77 CONG. REC. 3956 (1933).
25. For evidence that Glass-Steagall’s creators were motivated by institutional rather than
consumer concerns, see H. PARKER WILLIS & JOHN M. CHAPMAN, THE BANKING SITUATION 62-83
(1934) (reviewing history of Act’s origins from perspective of one of its key drafters). Section 21 of
the Act, which forced unlicensed private investment banks to stop taking deposits, was apparently
drafted by Winthrop Aldrich, chairman of Chase National Bank, and took direct aim at commercial
banks’ principal financial competitors at the time. See ARTHUR M. JOHNSON, WINTHROP W. ALDRICH:
LAWYER, BANKER, DIPLOMAT 150-51 (1968).
26. See Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Equal Credit
Opportunity Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
27. The exception was the Community Reinvestment Act, which made banks’ local lending
records a factor in the regulatory approval process for bank expansion. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1994).
Because the regulatory approval process is driven principally by soundness concerns, however, the
potential conflict between soundness and consumer goals made CRA enforcement problematic. See
infra Part I.D.
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preempt state consumer laws in areas such as usury ceilings28 and
prohibitions on credit card late charges.29
Recently, however, a sea change has occurred in bank regulation.
Significant portions of traditional regulation have been repealed30 or ar
under attack.31 Interestingly, however, as deregulation proceeds, regulatory
attention has shifted to consumer protection. This trend manifests itself in
two ways. First, and most obvious, is the promulgation of explicitly
proconsumer regulation, in the form of new rules or operating conditions
attached to decisions on regulatory applications. Second, and more subtle, is
the selective dismantling of certain restrictions that leave wholesale banking
markets deregulated while the regulation of retail markets remains intact. The
result is the creation, for bank regulatory purposes, of two markets: a largely
unregulated, sophisticated wholesale market and a highly regulated, retail
consumer market.32
A. Case 1: Bank Sales of Nondeposit Investment Products
The gradual dismantling of Glass-Steagall’s restrictions on bank
securities activities during the 1980s and 1990s provides a good example of
the changing goals of bank regulation. Even before legislative repeal of
Glass-Steagall was seriously considered,33 creative regulatory interpretation
of statutory language, endorsed by the federal courts, permitted banks to
28. See generally Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978)
(authorizing “exportation” of credit card interest rates permitted under usury ceilings of one state to
another state by national bank headquartered in first state and doing business in second).
29. See generally Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996) (upholding Office of Comptroller of
the Currency (“OCC”)’s regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a)).
30. See, e.g., Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (repealing interstate banking restrictions).
31. See Financial Services Act of 1999, H.R. 10, 106th Cong. (proposing repeal of key sections
of Glass-Steagall).
32. Although this Essay focuses on bank regulation, one may tentatively draw similar
conclusions about regulatory initiatives in other areas of financial law. For example, although
securities disclosure regulation was designed in part to protect consumers of securities products,
scholars traditionally identified other occasionally conflicting motives for the statutory scheme. See,
e.g., Alison Grey Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review,
25 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (1974) (suggesting dichotomy between consumer protection and informational
functions of securities regulation); Homer Kripke, Fifty Years of Securities Regulation in Search of a
Purpose, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 257, 260-77 (1984) (suggesting multiple purposes for disclosure
scheme). Recently, however, securities regulation appears to be driven primarily by consumer aims, as
manifested by initiatives such as the “plain English” requirement for disclosure documents, which
attempts to make prospectuses more user-friendly to less sophisticated investors, see Plain English
Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370 (1998) (to be codified throughout 17 C.F.R. §§ 228-230, 239, 274), and
the deregulation of wholesale securities markets, such as the 144A market, which reflects the new
paradigm that mandatory disclosure regulation is unnecessary unless unsophisticated consumers are
implicated.
33. See supra note 31.
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reenter most aspects of the securities business, from stock brokerage34 to
securities underwriting and dealing.35 A ong the way, however, banks have
been held to special standards governing the sales of securities products to
retail consumers. The language of Glass-Steagall made no distinction
between retail and wholesale securities activities.36 Rather, these new
standards reflected a modern consumer-oriented reading of statutory purpose.
A review of a few of the decisions that permitted banks to enter the
securities business illustrates this consumerization of Glass-Steagall law. In
1986 the Federal Reserve Board decided that Glass-Steagall did not prohibit
a bank affiliate from offering full brokerage services, including investment
advice and trade execution, to its customers.37 Although the Board concluded
that full service brokerage did not constitute the “issue, flotation,
underwriting, public sale, or distribution” of securities prohibited by the
Act,38 it did require that the brokerage services be offered only to institutional
customers.39 The Board favored this limitation because, when dealing with
wholesale clients, the bank affiliate would be less likely to engage in
“churning”40 or to offer unsuitable recommendations to unsophisticated
customers.41
Nothing in the language of Glass-Steagall supported this distinction
between retail and wholesale brokerage customers. In reading Glass-Steagall
34. See Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 214-
21 (1984).
35. See Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1988).
36. Glass-Steagall barred banks from affiliating with firms “engaged principally in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate
participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securities.” 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994). It also
prohibited banks from directly underwriting securities issues or dealing in securities except for
purchases and sales without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers. See 12
U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1994) (Federal
Reserve member banks). Finally, Glass-Steagall prevented management interlocks between banks and
securities firms and deposit-taking by securities firms. See 12 U.S.C. § 78, 378 (1994).
37. See National Westminster Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 584 (1986), aff’d sub nom.
Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
38. Id. at 592-93. In Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve
System, the Supreme Court upheld the Board’s determination that a discount brokerage was not a
prohibited securities activity. 468 U.S. 207 (1984). In National Westminster Bank PLC, the Board
decided that the addition of investment advice did not alter the legality of brokerage activities under
Glass-Steagall. 72 Fed. Res. Bull. at 591.
39. Institutional customers included financial institutions and natural persons with a net worth
over $5 million. A later ruling lowered this threshold to $1 million. See Manufacturers Hanover Corp.,
73 Fed. Res. Bull. 930 (1987).
40. Churning refers to excessive trading in brokerage accounts for the purpose of generating
commissions for the broker and is actionable under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. See, e.g., Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1990).
41. See National Westminster Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. at 591.
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as a consumer-protection statute, the Board was following the lead of the
Supreme Court. In an early look at congressional intent, the Court had
concluded that at least one of the goals of Glass-Steagall was to eliminate
certain “subtle hazards,” or conflicts of interest, that arose in the 1920s when
banks acted as securities sellers in retail markets.42 The Federal Reserve
Board went even further, relying on consumer protection goals to justify the
imposition of new rules governing how and to whom banks might offer
brokerage services.43
Although the Board eventually relaxed its interpretation of Glass-Steagall
to permit the offering of full service brokerage services to retail customers,44
each subsequent expansion of bank securities powers was coupled with new
rules designed to protect consumers. For example, when the Federal Reserve
Board permitted banks to establish securities affiliates to engage in limited
amounts of securities underwriting and dealing,45 its decisions contained a
series of operating conditions that were designed to maintain “firewalls”
between banking and securities operations. Several of these firewalls were
intended to prevent retail customers from confusing deposits with securities
products by requiring specific disclosures to customers that the securities
42. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630-33 (1971). For an analysis of how, after
Camp, preventing conflicts of interest became the chief articulated goal of Glass-Steagall, see Helen
A. Garten, Subtle Hazards, Financial Risks, and Diversified Banks: An Essay on the Perils of
Regulatory Reform, 49 MD. L. REV. 314, 323-30 (1990). Ironically, this reading of Glass-Steagall
planted the seeds for the statute’s destruction. Because the Glass-Steagall remedy of barring banks
from virtually all securities markets went so far beyond what was required to address consumer
abuses, the statutory language was construed narrowly in situations after Camp where retail concerns
were minimal. See, e.g., Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46,
66-67 (1981) (finding that “subtle hazards” were not present when bank acted as investment adviser to
closed-end mutual fund subject to regulatory oversight).
43. In deciding the NatWest application, the Board also had to determine the legality of
brokerage activities under the Bank Holding Company Act, which required consideration of whether
the public benefits of the proposed activity outweighed its possible adverse effects, including conflicts
of interest. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see also National Courier Ass’n v.
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In applying this balancing
test, it is not unusual for the Board to consider the applicant’s acceptance of operating conditions that
minimize opportunities for consumer abuse. Nevertheless, in NatWest, the applicant’s commitment to
abide by consumer protection rules figured prominently in the Board’s Glass-Steagall analysis as well.
See 72 Fed. Res. Bull. at 595; see also Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that Board properly considered operating limitations
when deciding whether bank securities activities would create “subtle hazards” that Glass-Steagall was
enacted to prevent).
44. See Bank of New Eng. Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 700, 704 (1988).
45. These decisions were known as the “Section 20 decisions” because they relied on an
interpretation of section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited banks from affiliating with
companies “engaged principally” in securities underwriting and dealing. See 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994).
The Board construed this language to permit bank holding companies to establish nonbank subsidiaries
that limited their securities underwriting business to a specified percentage of total revenues. See
Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 62-67 (2d Cir. 1988)
(upholding this interpretation of section 20).
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affiliate and the bank were completely independent entities46 a d tha , unlike
deposits, securities products offered by the bank securities affiliate were not
insured.47
The Board eventually dismantled many of its original firewalls that had
proved burdensome to banks,48 but it retained these disclosure requirements
for banks dealing with retail customers.49 Further, in 1994 the federal
banking agencies issued an Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of
Nondeposit Investment Products that extended the disclosure requirements to
all retail sales of securities products by employees of banks, bank securities
affiliates, and even unaffiliated broker-dealers operating on bank premises.50
In many cases, repeat disclosure is required every time that a sales
presentation is made or investment advice is provided to a retail customer.51
The Interagency Statement also specifies where sales of securities products
may occur and who may make them.52 Securities sales must be made as far
as possible from the deposit-taking area of the bank and by bank employees
who are not tellers. In 1998 bank regulators considered granting formal rule
status to the Interagency Statement guidelines and applying them specifically
46. See Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 503 (1987). Firewall #11 states:
An underwriting subsidiary will provide each of its customers with a special disclosure
statement describing the difference between the underwriting Subsidiary and its banking affiliates
. . . . The statement shall also indicate that the obligations of the underwriting subsidiary are not
those of any affiliated bank and that the bank is not responsible for securities sold by the
underwriting subsidiary.
Id.
47. See J.P. Morgan & Co., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192, 215 (1989). Firewall #14 states:
In addition [to disclosure of corporate separateness] the statement shall state that securities sold,
offered, or recommended by the underwriting subsidiary are not deposits, are not insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . are not guaranteed by an affiliated bank . . . and are not
otherwise an obligation or responsibility of such a bank.
Id.
48. For example, restrictions on credit extensions to underwriting customers, a significant part of
the original firewall structure, were removed in 1997. See Bank Holding Companies and Change in
Bank Control (Regulation Y); Amendments to Restrictions in the Board’s Section 20 Orders, 62 Fed.
Reg. 45,295 (1997) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
49. See Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control; Clarification to the Board’s
Section 20 Orders, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,803 (1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(4)). “Retail
customers” include anyone other than “accredited investors,” as defined in 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)
(1998). Accredited investors are institutions, insiders, and wealthy individuals with over $1 million in
net worth or $200,000 of income during each of the past two years.
50. See Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment Products, 1 Fed.
Reserve Reg. Serv. 3-1579.51 (Transmittal 177, Nov. 1995) [hereinafter Interagency Statement].
51. But see Bank Holding Companies and Charge in Bank Control; Clarification to the Board’s
Section 20 Orders, 63 Fed. Reg. at 14,803 (allowing securities affiliates operating off premises of
deposit-taking bank to satisfy disclosure requirements by providing one-time disclosure in writing).
52. See Interagency Statement, supra note 50, at 3-1579.51.
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to bank sales of retail insurance products.53
Legislative proposals to deregulate bank product markets also have
included new consumer regulation. Glass-Steagall repeal bills have contained
new antitying rules for the joint sale of bank and investment products that
would supplement existing prohibitions under banking and antitrust law.54
Some proposals also would call upon the bank regulators to create and
administer a new federal consumer complaint procedure to address problems
arising out of bank marketing of retail investment products.55
The significance of these requirements from a regulatory standpoint is
threefold. First, new consumer regulation has originated as a condition to
deregulation: Banks are being permitted to diversify into new financial
markets only if they comply with new regulatory requirements designed to
protect the consumer. Second, these rules only apply to dealings with retail
customers; wholesale customers presumably are sophisticated enough to
purchase nondeposit investment products from their banks without special
disclosures, tougher anticoercion rules, and new administrative remedies.
Finally, the new regulation reflects a view that the existing legal
framework prohibiting unfair marketing tactics in the sale of financial
products, whether under federal securities law, antitrust law, or state
consumer law, is inadequate for sales to retail bank customers. The recent
involvement of the bank regulators may reflect gaps in existing regulation;
for example, federal securities law currently exempts some banks from
regulation as broker-dealers.56 New regulation may also reflect a degree of
regulatory competition between bank regulators and other financial
regulatory agencies, particularly the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”), for authority over newly diversified banks.57
53. See OCC News Release 98-12 (Jan. 30, 1998), available in 1998 WL 36006.
54. See, e.g., Financial Services Act of 1999, H.R. 10, 106th Cong. § 176. In the past, bank
regulation has focused on both express tying arrangements that force customers to buy investment
products from their bank and so-called “voluntary” ties, or conduct that leads customers to believe that
buying an investment product improves their chances of obtaining bank credit. For discussion of
antitying rules as a possible example of overregulation, see infra Part II.B.2.
55. See Financial Services Act of 1999, H.R. 10, 106th Cong. § 176.
56. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (1994). Bank securities affiliates, which are separate
entities from the bank, are not exempt from registration as broker-dealers and are already subject to
securities regulation of marketing practices. Legislation pending in early 1999 would narrow the bank
exemption, requiring many banks directly engaged in securities activities to register with the SEC. See
H.R. 10 § 201.
57. See, e.g., Securities: Roberts Voices Concerns About Bank Securities Activities, Banking
Rep. (BNA), at 459 (Sept. 29, 1994) (SEC officials call for legislation giving SEC oversight authority
over all bank securities activities). At present, both the bank regulators and the securities regulators
have asserted authority to supervise sales of securities products to bank customers. In 1998 the NASD
adopted a rule governing retail sales of securities products by broker-dealers on bank premises that
overlaps with the Interagency Statement. See NATIONAL ASS’N SEC. DEALERS, NASD NOTICE TO
MEMBERS 97-89: SEC APPROVES BANK BROKER/DEALER RULE; EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY 15, 1998, at
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B. Case 2: Mandatory Disclosure
Traditionally, bank regulatory policy reflected considerable ambivalence
about the desirability of public disclosure of information about bank
condition, particularly for problem banks. Although most large banking
organizations with public shareholders were subject to the mandatory
disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws,58 at times bank
regulators resisted the SEC’s attempts to force public revelation of banking
problems.59 Moreover, banking law barred disclosure of certain regulatory
data, such as the results of supervisory examinations60 and he agencies’
problem bank lists, that were material to bank investors and depositors. In
1986 I identified the lack of regulatory information about banks as a possible
obstacle to realistic market discipline of banks by either wholesale or retail
depositors.61
Traditionally, the justification for secrecy was that adverse market
reaction to negative information about banks might lead to deposit runs and
bank failure, compounding the regulatory cost of dealing with banking
problems. Since regulatory examinations and supervision of banks were
designed to safeguard the deposit insurance fund, not to protect bank
investors, regulators had no duty to inform the public of impending
problems.62 In some cases, in the name of preserving confidence in the
banking system, regulators may have even misled investors. For example,
just one week before the government bailout of Continental Illinois, the
Comptroller of the Currency issued a press release stating that it was unaware
of any basis for the rumors of the bank’s imminent failure.63
735, 739-40 (1997). For further discussion of the consequences of this regulatory duplication, see infra
Part III.B.
58. The federal securities laws treat banks differently from bank holding companies. Banks, but
not holding companies, were originally exempted from the periodic disclosure requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Amendment to Rule AN8, 1 Fed. Reg. 2117 (1936). In 1974
Congress required the bank regulators to adopt disclosure rules for banks that were substantially
similar to the SEC’s disclosure requirements applicable to nonbanks, including bank holding
companies. See Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. I, § 105(b), 88 Stat. 1500, 1503 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78l(1) (1994)).
59. See, e.g., John R. Evans, Disclosure Through a Glass Darkly, 27 ADMIN. L. REV. 357, 358-
63 (1975) (describing bank regulators’ opposition to SEC’s attempt to require disclosure of problems
at U.S. National Bank and Franklin National Bank).
60. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.6025(c) (1994) (forbidding disclosure of examination reports); Consumers
Union v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming exemption of bank examination
reports from FOIA disclosure).
61. See Garten, supra note 21, at 143.
62. See First State Bank of Hudson County v. United States, 599 F.2d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 1979).
63. See Inquiry into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National Bank: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 273
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Recently, however, disclosure by and about banks has improved
substantially, including information about regulatory assessment of bank
condition.64 Although the regulators’ motive has been to substitute private
market discipline for government supervision,65 the effect, whether intended
or unintended, has been to correct some information asymmetries that
previously disadvantaged bank investors and consumers. Of course,
improving disclosure does not enhance consumer protection if consumers
cannot use information for their own benefit. Wholesale investors may be
more likely than retail investors to employ information efficiently.66
Nevertheless, information provides every investor with opportunities for self-
protection that were unavailable under a regulatory regime that attempted to
hide banking problems from public view. Perhaps more important for the
retail investor, a disclosure regime also provides investors with a powerful
legal remedy if they suffer investment losses as a result of misleading or
incomplete information.67
C. Case 3: Bank Failure Resolution
Traditional bank failure policy was driven primarily by the desire to
eliminate systemic risk. The most serious risk was the domino effect, when
one bank’s failure disrupts the operations of large numbers of correspondent
banks, causing them to fail as well. Alternatively, the failure of a single
major bank may destroy public confidence in the banking system as a whole,
resulting in widespread deposit runs and multiple failures.
(1984).
64. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(u) (1994) (mandating publication of content of cease and desist
orders imposed on banks by regulators).
65. For critical analysis of this motive, see Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A
Perspective on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 558-64 (1989). For
recent evidence that this motive is still driving regulatory strategy, see Jaret Seiberg, Fed Officials Say
the Markets Could Do Regulators’ Work, AM. BANKER, Sept. 21, 1998, at 1 (Federal Reserve
governor suggests that subordinated debt markets could act as early warning system to alert regulators
of impending financial problems at regulated banks).
66. The ability of depositors to use disclosure to protect themselves from bank risk is subject to
debate. See Garten, supra note 21, at 129. Even more sophisticated investors may not use information
efficiently. Some scholars question the ability of bank equityholders to interpret correctly the signals
conveyed by the current regime of risk-based capital requirements, suggesting that investors may draw
unduly negative inferences from new capital issues and demand excessive risk premiums from some
issuing banks. If banks could meet mandatory capital requirements by substituting subordinated debt,
which is less sensitive to market signals, bank capital costs would decline. See Larry D. Wall &
Pamela P. Peterson, The Choice of Capital Instruments, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON.
REV., 2d Quarter 1998, at 4.
67. Under federal securities laws, false or incomplete disclosure may give rise to a private civil
action for damages. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). Moreover, if the misstatement is part of
public disclosure, then the plaintiff need not prove actual reliance. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988).
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Scholars continue to debate whether either of these scenarios is likely to
occur, and that assessment is beyond the scope of this Essay. Certainly,
however, most critics would agree that the bank regulators took these risks
seriously. Moreover, even when systemic risk was not a factor, bank failure
policy was constrained by the concern, common to all insurance schemes, to
minimize expenditures from the insurance fund.68 Correctly or incorrectly,
bank regulators usually concluded that maintaining a bank as a going
concern, usually by selling its franchise to a healthy bank, was a less costly
solution than liquidating the bank’s assets.69
As a result, bank failure resolution became identified with bank failure
prevention, an approach that seemed inconsistent with a deposit insurance
scheme that appeared to be concerned primarily with protecting small
depositors. Critics cited the willingness of the regulators to dispose of failing
banks in ways that protected wholesale institutional depositors, non-U.S.
investors, and even nondeposit creditors as evidence of a departure from the
consumer protection goals of the insurance scheme.70 Alt ough historical
analysis suggests that, from the beginning, deposit insurance was designed
with institutional goals in mind,71 critics were certainly correct that consumer
protection had been relegated at best to secondary status.
In recent years, however, bank failure policy has been reshaped to reflect
the consumer protection rather than the institutional goals of deposit
insurance. Legislative limitations on regulatory discretion to fashion
solutions for banking problems were designed to strip bank failure policy of
its failure-prevention bias, relegating the FDIC to the more narrow role of
administrator of an insurance scheme for small depositors.72 The mo t
dramatic change has been the legislative curtailment of the too big to fail
policy. Currently, any decision that systemic risk justifies the use of deposit
insurance monies to save a failing bank must be a political rather than a
68. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (requiring least cost resolution of bank
failure).
69. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., EDWARD J. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 163
(1985) (“Conceived in 1933 as a device for protecting small depositors[, deposit insurance] functions
today as a system for implicitly guaranteeing the capacity of the deposit institution system to make
good on all but a small percentage of outstanding debt.”).
71. See, e.g., Garten, supra note 12; Golembe, supra note 12.
72. For example, in the name of keeping deposit insurance funds available for their “intended
purpose only,” the FDIC is forbidden from taking any action that would increase losses to the
insurance fund by protecting uninsured depositors or creditors. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997). Moreover, although “least cost” remains the primary determinant of resolution
technique, Congress has specified how the agency may make its calculation, for example, requiring
lost federal tax revenues to be treated as a resolution cost. See id. § 1823(c)(4)(B)(ii).
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regulatory judgment.73
Interestingly, the complaint against traditional bank failure policy was not
just its cost but also its unfairness. Deposit insurance funds, intended for the
benefit of the retail depositor, were unjustly enriching sophisticated
wholesale investors. Although exposing wholesale investors to the risk of
loss in the event of bank failure does not by itself enhance the protections
afforded the retail consumer,74 it does reflect a philosophy of regulation that
is consistent with the consumerization of regulatory function. Traditionally,
intrusive government regulation of private business relationships between
banks and their customers has been justified by the existence of the deposit
insurance subsidy. Since insurance removes incentives for banks to limit
their own risktaking, the government as insurer must protect itself by
imposing its own controls. Conversely, if public subsidies of private
contracts between banks and their large sophisticated customers are removed,
the government has no reason to intrude upon those relationships.
Thus, the shift in bank failure policy provides a justification for
deregulation of banking markets except to the extent that it implicates
insured depositors and the deposit insurance fund. Banking markets are
bifurcated into a highly regulated retail sector that enjoys the insurance
subsidy and an unregulated and unsubsidized wholesale sector. This
bifurcation is reflected in recent legislative proposals for uninsured wholesale
financial institutions that would give up the right to accept insured retail
deposits in exchange for broader powers to diversify than those afforded
insured retail banks.75
D. Case 4: Community Reinvestment
Since its adoption in 1977, the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”)76
provided an exception to the traditional safety and soundness orientation of
bank regulatory policy. CRA requires federal bank regulators to encourage
financial institutions to help to meet the credit needs of their local
73. Rather than making its own finding that systemic risk justifies failure prevention, the FDIC,
together with the Federal Reserve Board, must now (1) take a formal vote of board members and (2)
make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Treasury. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i). The
Secretary of the Treasury must (3) consult with the President, (4) notify relevant congressional
committees, and (5) prepare and maintain documentation of the determination. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(c)(4(E)(i),(iii),(v). The documentation is to be (6) reviewed by the GAO. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(c)(4)(G)(iv).
74. Since deposit insurance is funded by assessments paid by insured banks, the cost of
subsidizing large depositors is not imposed directly on the public. But if the government grants tax
benefits to entice buyers to acquire failing institutions, the public may bear some indirect costs. See
supra note 72.
75. See, e.g., Financial Services Act of 1999, H.R. 10, 106th Cong. § 136.
76. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994).
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communities.77 Enforcement takes place through the regulatory application
process, which requires regulators to take CRA compliance into account in
ruling on bank requests to establish new branches, merge, or engage in
certain other corporate restructurings that require prior regulatory approval.78
To the extent that the goals of the Community Reinvestment Act are in
conflict with soundness goals, the statute has been criticized by both
scholars79 and bank regulators.80 Moreover, the conflict was at least partially
responsible for an enforcement record that was unsatisfactory both to the
statute’s defenders and to its opponents. On the one hand, community
activists could legitimately complain that CRA implementation was random
and lax, depending on the fortuity of a regulatory application process that
was preoccupied with other issues.81 Critics could make the same charge,
arguing that CRA considerations were irrelevant to the real concerns raised
by regulatory applications, such as competitive effect and managerial
competence.82
Although these critiques could have resulted in the demise of CRA, in
recent years enforcement has been strengthened.83 Bank regulators rate banks
for CRA compliance just as they rate banks for safety and soundness. Since
1990 CRA ratings have been disclosed to the public.84 Repeal of legal
restrictions on interstate bank branching has been accompanied by new rules
requiring special regulatory oversight of CRA compliance by the new
multistate megabank.85 The Comptroller of the Currency has begun
77. See id. § 2901. The statute qualifies this obligation by requiring that community lending be
consistent with the safe and sound operation of the bank, but this caveat suggests the inherent conflict
between CRA goals and the soundness goals of other bank regulation.
78. See id. § 2902.
79. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An
Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 295 (1993) (arguing that CRA impairs safety and soundness
of banking industry).
80. See, e.g., Claudia Cummins, Boston Fed Chief Faults Broad-Brush Use of CRA, AM.
BANKER, July 22, 1983, at 1.
81. Since the regulators lacked statutory authority under CRA to punish noncompliance by direct
administrative action, enforcement had to await the offending bank’s filing of a regulatory application.
Even then, CRA compliance was simply one factor to be considered, and an unsatisfactory record did
not require a denial of the application. See, e.g., Corning Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Federal Home Loan
Bank Bd., 571 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff’d, 736 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1984).
82. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1994) (requiring Federal Reserve to consider competitive
effects and financial and managerial resources, as well as convenience and needs of community, when
deciding an application for expansion under Bank Holding Company Act).
83. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995) (creating new
CRA regulations intended to improve administration of Act).
84. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2) (1994).
85. See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
328, tit. I, § 110, 108 Stat. 2338, 2364 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2906 (1994)) (requiring
state-by-state evaluation of CRA compliance by banks with interstate branches); id. § 109, 108 Stat. at
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continuous CRA examinations of large multibranch national banks.86
Moreover, deregulation is making CRA enforcement a relatively more
significant factor in the regulatory application process. Removal of legal
barriers to interstate acquisitions has resulted in the filing of more regulatory
applications, subjecting more banks more frequently to the enforcement
mechanism of CRA. As traditional antitrust and competitive concerns
become less significant barriers to bank expansion, CRA compliance is
emerging as a more important determinant of the success or failure of a
regulatory application. Although in the past competitors might have been
expected to protest applications for bank expansion, deregulation has turned
challengers into applicants. Community groups, however, remain ready and
willing to challenge proposed mergers and acquisitions, particularly large
deals that tend to generate significant publicity. Such large deals carry the
possibility of substantial financial commitments by the resulting megabank to
increase community lending.87
Finally, as a political matter, legislators must justify their support for
financial deregulation to constituents who are worried about its effect on the
consumer. Coupling deregulation of wholesale financial markets with
heightened CRA enforcement can satisfy community groups that might
otherwise lobby against banking law reform. This may explain why, as
deregulation is freeing financial institutions to compete across industry lines,
political pressure is mounting to extend the CRA obligation beyond banks to
all financial firms.88
II. THE COSTS OF CONSUMERIZATION
If the sea change suggested in this Essay is real, does it create any dangers
for the bank regulatory system? Two possibilities exist: consumerization may
result in either the underproduction or the overproduction of regulation.
Ironically, in the long run, the latter may present the more serious problem.
The creation of two markets may disadvantage the retail consumer who is
denied the quality and variety of services available in less regulated markets.
2362 (allowing bank regulators to close interstate branches for noncompliance with CRA).
86. See Jaret Seiberg, Comptroller To Keep Year-Round CRA Watch on New Megabanks, AM.
BANKER, May 20, 1998, at 1.
87. Some new megabanks have agreed to make long-term national commitments to fund
community projects in order to avoid CRA challenges although at least one expansion-minded bank
has resisted this trend. See Brett Chase, New Banc One Shuns Nationwide CRA Pledge, AM. BANKER,
July 9, 1998, at 8.
88. See, e.g., Jaret Seiberg, Regulators’ Plea to Banks: Lend More to Inner Cities, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 13, 1998, at 1 (citing political call to extend CRA to insurance and securities firms).
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A. Underproduction of Regulation
The consumerization of regulation means that financial markets,
traditionally bifurcated along producer lines, are now bifurcating along
customer lines. In theory, if this trend continues, wholesale financial markets
will operate largely without regulation while retail financial markets will
remain largely regulated. Although this result initially may appear to be a
proper allocation of regulatory resources, it raises several questions of
regulatory efficiency that deserve more careful consideration. First, is the
premise that there is no justification for government regulation of wholesale
markets correct?89 Second, in practice, can that premise ever become a
sufficient basis for a regulatory policy?
The case for deregulation of wholesale markets has both economic and
philosophical roots. Sophisticated investors presumably can bargain with
financial services providers for the degree of protection that they require
more efficiently than the government can legislate on their behalf. Private
bargains may avoid externalities, such as moral hazard, that result from
sweeping government protection schemes such as deposit insurance.90 As a
result, proponents of deregulation of wholesale markets argue, everybody
wins. But the argument for deregulation of wholesale markets is also an
argument against subsidization of sophisticated investors and, in this respect,
has distinctly moral overtones. Government subsidies, the argument goes, are
intended to protect small consumers who cannot protect themselves, not to
excuse sophisticated investors from the responsibility of negotiating for their
own protection. Inequality of bargaining power becomes a proxy for
entitlement to regulatory protection.
Nevertheless, occasionally even the most sophisticated of investors
appear incapable of protecting themselves. In the 1990s the unlucky
experiences of several corporate and institutional investors with derivatives
led to regulatory intervention, despite the sophistication of the derivatives
market. Banks that sold derivatives were forced to comply with mandatory
disclosure rules and other consumer protection regulations that were
strikingly similar to the regulations imposed on banks that sell investment
products to retail consumers.91
89. See Hooked on Financial Red Tape, supra note 1, at 65 (quoting Merton Miller).
90. Moral hazard arises from the different risk tolerances of insured parties (in this case, private
investors) and insurers (in this case, the government). Government subsidization makes private
investors more willing to take risk than they would be absent the subsidy. Although usually applied to
deposit insurance, the moral hazard concept may be relevant to other forms of regulatory subsidy as
well. See KANE, supra note 70, at 14-15.
91. See New Derivatives Safeguards Imposed As Bankers Trust, Fed Reach Agreement, 63
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In other cases, although wholesale customers have been able to protect
themselves, the consequences of self-protection have been intolerable and
have required regulatory intervention. The fact that wholesale deposit runs
are likely to be far more devastating to the depository bank and the banking
system than retail deposit runs informed bank failure policy in the 1930s.
Evidence showed that, between 1930 and 1933, large deposits were
withdrawn at a faster rate than small deposits.92 The ame problem emerged
in the 1980s, when Continental Illinois’ heavy reliance on wholesale deposits
made the bank vulnerable to sudden electronic runs and forced government
intervention.93 As a result, at least in the past, regulators used bank failure
policy to reassure wholesale investors in order to discourage them from
protecting themselves from bank risk by joining deposit runs.
Although changes in the law governing bank failure resolution have
deemphasized bank runs and systemic risk as justifications for government
protection of uninsured depositors,94 recent concern over the danger of global
financial market disruption has provided a new reason to intervene in
wholesale financial markets. Ironically, government intervention to prevent
market disruption may prove to be even more intrusive than traditional bank
failure policy because the intervention is no longer limited to bank deposit
markets. The September 1998 rescue of the troubled hedge fund, Long-Term
Capital Management, provides an indication of what may be coming.
Although the rescue package did not include public funds, the Federal
Reserve reportedly played a pivotal role in brokering a private bailout,
justifying its intervention in wholesale markets by reference to the possible
financial market disruption that might have occurred had the fund failed and
been forced to liquidate its portfolio of complex financial instruments.95
This concern over market disruption is in some ways reminiscent of 1970,
Banking Rep. (BNA), at 895 (Dec. 16, 1994). Among other requirements, the derivatives sales
business must be conducted so that each customer has the “capability to understand the nature and
material terms, conditions, and risks” of the transaction, and sales personnel must provide specific
information to assist customers to understand risk factors associated with derivatives products. The
Interagency Statement covering bank sales of retail investment products calls on sellers to disclose that
nondeposit investment products are subject to investment risks, including the possible loss of principal.
See Interagency Statement, supra note 50, at 3-1579.51.
92. See Behavior of Deposits Prior to Suspension in a Selected Group of Banks—Analysis by
Size of Account, 25 Fed. Res. Bull. 178, 178 (1939) (showing 70% decline in demand deposits of
$100,000 or more but negligible decline in deposits of $200 or less).
93. See Inquiry into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National Bank, supra
note 63, at 28.
94. See supra Part I.C.
95. See Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan
Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services Re: Private-Sector Refinancing of the
Large Hedge Fund, Long-Term Capital Management, Federal News Service, Oct. 1, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW file [hereinafter Greenspan Remarks].
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when Penn Central’s default threatened the commercial paper market. As
nervous wholesale investors abandoned the market, other commercial paper
issuers faced liquidity crises and potential insolvency. The Federal Reserve
intervened to reassure the market, making liquidity available through the
banking system to allow issuers to pay off maturing paper that could no
longer be rolled over.96
Although not perfectly analogous, both examples demonstrate that
wholesale financial markets are vulnerable to panic despite the sophistication
of their players. Moreover, to the extent that modern wholesale financial
markets are increasingly integrated, deal in esoteric financial products, and
rely on reputational interest and informal agreement to structure
relationships,97 loss of confidence may be even a more serious problem in
wholesale markets than in retail markets. If the danger of global financial
disruption is sufficient to justify government intervention in wholesale
markets, then the bifurcation of markets as a practical matter can never be
completed.
Finally, globalization may actually retard the bifurcation of financial
markets. The distinction between wholesale and retail markets may have
little currency outside of the United States, where universal banks have
traditionally operated in both markets. If, in much of the world, the universal
banking model shapes public perception of banks, regulatory distinctions
between the two markets may prove counterproductive. U.S. regulators may
be forced to rescue wholesale financial institutions for fear that a wholesale
bank failure will cause non-U.S. investors to lose confidence in retail banks
as well.
If some regulatory involvement in wholesale markets is likely to continue,
then the question arises whether deregulation will complicate regulatory
responsibility. One might argue that wholesale markets, unlike retail markets,
require supervision rather than regulation. In other words, the government
should monitor wholesale financial markets to detect problems but should
not prevent risktaking by their participants. Nevertheless, supervision is
likely to prove increasingly difficult as deregulated firms grow larger, more
integrated, and more complex. If monitoring fails, yet regulators are still
96. For a description of the Federal Reserve’s role following the bankruptcy of Penn Central and
the threat to the commercial paper markets, see WILLIAM C. MELTON, INSIDE THE FED: MAKING
MONETARY POLICY 157-58 (1985).
97. For example, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Greenspan cited the “scale and scope of
[Long-Term Capital Management’s] operations, which encompassed many markets, maturities, and
currencies and often relied on instruments that were thinly traded and had prices that were not
continuously quoted” as reasons why the hedge fund’s failure might have had unpredictable and
potentially devastating effects on world financial markets. See Greenspan Remarks, supra note 95.
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required to intervene to minimize market disruption, regulatory costs may
mount.
In response, regulators are likely to rely increasingly on participants in
wholesale financial markets to monitor the health of financial firms and to
provide an early warning of impending trouble. Nevertheless, reliance on
wholesale customers may prove misplaced if those customers are incapable
of recognizing and protecting themselves from risk. For example, wholesale
investors apparently failed to appreciate the volume and nature of risks taken
by Long-Term Capital Management.98 Even equityholders, who as residual
claimants have reason to appreciate investment risk, may not always be good
monitors. Critics of bank capital regulation, which requires banks to subject
themselves to the discipline of the equity market, now argue that
equityholders are prone to overestimate bank risk and that subordinated
debtholders may be better at reading market signals.99
This quest to find the perfect monitor suggests the difficulty of
supervision and implies a need for some continued government involvement
in wholesale markets. A regulatory policy that focuses primarily on retail
markets runs the danger of underregulation, which may prove costly to all
financial markets in the long run.
B. Overproduction of Regulation
The consumerization of regulation means that, as wholesale financial
markets are deregulated, regulation of retail markets remains intact or is
strengthened. This is occurring partly by legislative design and partly by
accident as financial institutions evade regulatory restrictions by innovating
products and services. For example, financial firms circumvented laws
requiring banking, securities, and insurance activities to be conducted as
separate lines of business by developing financial equivalents. Banks were
prohibited by law from underwriting insurance, but they could write put
options protecting clients against declines in the value of their assets. These
options were functionally equivalent to insurance contracts but were legally
still bank products.100
With the important exception of the money market mutual fund,101
however, innovative financial products tend to be restricted to wholesale
markets. Retail consumers may be wary of unfamiliar and esoteric
98. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
99. See Wall & Peterson, supra note 66, at 4.
100. See Greenspan Tells Why Financial Modernization Is Urgent, 16 BANKING POL’Y REP. 6
(May 19, 1997) (citing this example of financial equivalents).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
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instruments such as put options and may prefer the more familiar insurance
policy. Moreover, the development and mass marketing of complex hybrid
financial products may cost too much to warrant their use in retail markets.
Through financial innovation, therefore, wholesale financial markets (but
not retail markets) have experienced significant deregulation without
congressional action. Ironically, the impact of formal statutory deregulation
is likely to be felt primarily by retail markets, whose participants have not yet
shared the benefits of financial innovation. Nevertheless, statutory
deregulation is likely to be accompanied by the imposition of new consumer
protection rules that make operating in retail markets more costly. If these
costs are shifted to retail customers, or if financial firms respond by avoiding
retail markets, then the new consumer regulation may prove
counterproductive, denying retail customers the benefits of deregulation that
wholesale markets already enjoy.
1. Marketing Restrictions
The potential for overregulation of retail markets is suggested by the new
rules governing the marketing of retail investment products to bank
customers. As previously described, sellers of nondeposit investment
products such as mutual funds, securities, and insurance must comply with
detailed disclosure rules when dealing with retail bank customers.102 De pite
the straightforward content of the mandatory disclosure,103 in many cases, the
disclosure must be repeated each time that a sales presentation is made or
investment advice is given to a retail customer.104 M reover, the disclosure
requirements apply not just to bank employees, but also to the employees of
bank securities affiliates operating off-bank premises and to representatives
of unaffiliated broker-dealers making recommendations or sales on bank
premises.105
The requirement for repeat disclosure imposes significant monitoring
costs on banks with substantial securities operations, particularly those with
large numbers of registered representatives operating from multiple offices.
In fact, the Federal Reserve has agreed with the banking industry that, when
retail securities operations are conducted by separately incorporated
securities affiliates that do not operate on bank premises, the burden of
102. See supra Part I.A.
103. Sellers must disclose that nondeposit investment products are not insured and are subject to
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complying with the repeat disclosure requirement outweighs the benefits to
consumers. Therefore, employees of securities affiliates are required to make
the disclosures only once, in writing, upon opening a retail investment
account.106
If compliance costs outweigh the benefits of repeat disclosure in the case
of bank securities affiliates, may the same calculation be made with respect
to any seller of retail investment products, even those operating on bank
premises? The obligation to make repeat disclosure only arises in the context
of an ongoing relationship between broker and customer. Established
customers, however, may telephone their brokers several times a day to
discuss their investments.107 If these customers have opened an investment
account, they have already acknowledged in writing that they have received
and understand the mandatory disclosures.108
Moreover, many of these clients, although retail customers, are
experienced investors who understand that securities products are not insured
deposits. For the purposes of the bank disclosure rules, retail customers may
include anyone other than “accredited investors” as defined by the securities
laws.109 As a result, nonfinancial corporate clients and individuals who do
not meet the securities law’s net worth or income tests may be treated as
retail investors, regardless of their prior experience in the securities markets.
For established customers, repeat disclosure may be unnecessary at best.
At worst, banks have argued, it may interfere with client relationships.110
Moreover, repeat disclosure may prove counterproductive if bank securities
employees and their customers view it as “boilerplate,” ignoring its content
as they repeat it by rote.
The disclosure rules are not the only examples of consumer regulation
that may not always benefit consumers. Regulation of retail sales of
investment products also aims to separate as far as possible the bank’s
deposit-taking operations from its nondeposit investment sales operations.
Regulation governs both the physical location of investment sales operations
and the methods used by the bank to market securities products. For
example, customers must go to a different area of the bank from the deposit-
106. See Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control; Clarification to the Board’s
Section 20 Orders, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,803 (1998) (to be cofified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(h)).
107. See id. at 14,803.
108. See Interagency Statement, supra note 50, at 3-1579.51 (requiring written acknowledgment
when investment account is opened that customer has received and understands disclosures).
109. Accredited investors are institutions, insiders, and high net worth individuals. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a) (1998). Although the Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment
Products does not define a “retail customer,” the Federal Reserve’s Regulation Y, which requires bank
securities affiliates to follow the Interagency Statement, defines a retail customer as anyone other than
an accredited investor. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(4)(i) n.4 (1998).
110. See 63 Fed. Reg. 14,803 (1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (noting this complaint).
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taking area in order to buy securities products.111 Overall, the regulatory goal
is to minimize customer confusion of insured deposit products with
uninsured securities products. The effect may be to call into question many
cross-marketing techniques that deregulated banks intend to use to introduce
their retail customers to new and unfamiliar investment products.
A 1998 enforcement action brought by securities regulators against a
national bank and its securities subsidiary illustrates the vulnerability of
many cross-marketing techniques to the charge that they create the potential
for customer confusion. The facts of this case suggested violations of both
suitability and antifraud rules. For example, securities regulators found that
the bank’s securities sales personnel had specifically targeted unsophisticated
bank depositors to buy high-risk closed-end bond funds that invested in
derivatives.112 Although these legal violations were sufficient to warrant a
regulatory enforcement action, the regulators also criticized specific cross-
marketing practices that, while not illegal by themselves, taken together were
found to blur distinctions between bank and securities products. These
practices included mass mailings of securities sales literature in envelopes
similar to those used for bank statements,113 posters in bank branches with
the slogans “Invest in Tomorrow Where You Bank Today” and “Introducing
the Investment Firm You Can Bank On,” and instructions to securities sales
personnel to avoid securities “lingo” because bank customers would find
bank terminology “less alarming.”114
In this case, investors complained that they had assumed that the bond
funds were bank products; these complaints, together with the extreme
disparity between the investors’ experience and the riskiness of the
investment, explain the regulators’ interest in this bank’s marketing practices.
Nevertheless, the regulators’ repeated criticism of the bank’s “blurring
conduct” suggests that other banks contemplating cross-marketing may have
to presume ex ante that their retail customers lack sufficient sophistication
and experience easily to distinguish between insured and uninsured
investments. Moreover, when cross-marketing is involved, it is unclear
111. See Interagency Statement, supra note 50, at 3-1579.51.
112. See In re NationsSecurities and NationsBank, N.A., SEC Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-
9596, 1998 SEC LEXIS 833, at *12-*13 (May 4, 1998). Typical investors were elderly, low-income
and inexperienced, having never invested in anything other than bank certificates of deposit. They
were told that the bond funds were “as safe as CDs but better because they paid more.” See id. at *11-
*14.
113. Cf. Interagency Statement, supra note 50, at 3-1579.51 (allowing joint advertising of deposit
and nondeposit products but requiring that advertising materials “clearly segregate” information about
each product).
114. See In re NationsSecurities and NationsBank, N.A., 1998 SEC LEXIS 833, at *22-*26.
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whether compliance with the mandatory disclosure requirements can
counteract the blurring effect that other sales practices may create.115
If banks must presume that joint selling of bank and securities products
may create customer confusion, then they may have to rethink many cross-
marketing techniques. Yet the opportunity to cross-market products to retail
customers is one of the reasons for banks to invest in new nonbanking
businesses—and one of the public benefits cited by the bank regulators when
they have permitted banks to enter new businesses.116 Among the potential
benefits for retail bank customers are access to new financial products and
the convenience of “one-stop shopping” for financial services. The customers
most likely to value these benefits are novice investors who do not already
employ independent securities brokers or financial advisers. These customers
have the most to gain from cross-marketing but are also the most likely to be
confused.
Ironically, in the past, the failure of most newly diversified banks to
implement aggressive cross-marketing strategies that integrate retail sales of
bank and nonbank products may have cost them clients and deprived their
customers of the benefits of one-stop shopping. A 1998 survey found that
many bank employees were not yet aware that their banks offered insurance
products and actually turned away prospective retail customers.117 According
to one bank brokerage executive, similar problems arose when banks first
began offering retail securities products but were resolved when management
encouraged securities sales personnel to work alongside bankers so that they
“became part of the banking family.”118 Now that the securities regulators
have indicated that making a securities sales employee “a face at the bank”
may impermissibly blur distinctions between insured and uninsured financial
products,119 however, it is unclear how far banks can go in attempting to
integrate their different product marketing teams.
Banks may face another problem as they compete in new retail financial
markets. The securities regulators have also suggested that the “hub and
spoke” organizational structure120 ypical of independent brokerage firms is
115. In the NationsSecurities case, sales manuals instructed securities sales personnel to disclose
to customers that securities products were not FDIC-insured, but the regulators concluded that this
policy was inadequate to prevent the blurring caused by other sales practices, including the failure to
differentiate between securities employees and bank employees. See id. at *27-*28.
116. See, e.g., Travelers Group Inc., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 985, 1009-12 (1998) (Order Approving
Formation of a Bank Holding Company and Notice to Engage in Nonbanking Activities).
117. See Michael O’D. Moore, Bankers Drawing a Blank on Insurance Offerings, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 13, 1998, at 1 (survey of 26 banks found that 69% of branch employees did not know that their
banks sold insurance).
118. Id. at 9 (quoting chairman of bank brokerage unit).
119. See In re NationsSecurities and NationsBank, N.A., 1998 SEC LEXIS 833, at *22.
120. Id. at *26. Under this structure, supervisors worked in hubs while registered representatives
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inappropriate for a banking organization engaged in retail securities sales
because it does not permit adequate monitoring and control of the marketing
practices of sales personnel.121 Since similar monitoring problems
presumably plague nonbank brokerage firms with decentralized
organizational structures, why have banks been singled out for special
criticism? It may reflect the regulators’ belief that conduct by bank securities
sales personnel that blurs distinctions between bank and securities products is
either more pervasive or more pernicious than other consumer abuses in the
brokerage industry. Nevertheless, if banks must adopt special new
organizational structures to guard against the dangers of blurring conduct,
they are likely to face significant costs and possible competitive
disadvantages when they enter retail securities markets.
2. Tying Restrictions
Interestingly, the charge of overregulation that may be leveled at the new
consumer rules governing retail sales of nondeposit investment products is
reminiscent of the complaints traditionally made about enforcement of bank
antitying regulation. Antitying rules attempt to protect bank customers from
pressure to purchase multiple financial products from their banks as a
condition to obtaining credit. If interpreted too broadly, however, antitying
rules may actually deprive retail investors of opportunities for cost savings in
the purchase of financial products. In the past, bank regulators have
recognized this anomaly and created exceptions to the tying rules when
benefits to consumers were apparent. Ironically, the consumerization of
regulation may reverse this trend, breathing new life into antitying
regulation.122
As a legal matter, tying by banks traditionally has been viewed more
seriously than tying by nonbank firms.123 For example, in tying cases
involving banks, most courts have not required a showing that the offending
bank had any special market power over the tying product (usually credit).124
Moreover, banks have been accused of exploiting customers through so-
worked in spokes, which in this case consisted of over 2000 separate banking centers. See id. at *26-
*27.
121. See id.
122. See generally supra note 55 and accompanying text.
123. In addition to the antitrust laws, banks are subject to special antitying rules contained in the
Bank Holding Company Act and administered by the Federal Reserve. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
124. See, e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, 679 F.2d 242 (11th Cir.
1982); cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-16 (1984) (requiring proof of
market power to prosecute tying arrangements under Sherman Act).
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called “voluntary” ties, when prospective borrowers simply believe that
buying a second product from the bank will help them obtain credit.125 The
danger of voluntary tying has often been cited as a reason to bar bank entry
into new retail financial product markets such as insurance.126
Some economists have argued that even explicit tying arrangements may
benefit consumers through cost savings from joint production and sale of
related products, reductions in transactions costs, and the efficient
reallocation of risk between seller and buyer.127 For xample, by requiring
customers to purchase a package of financial products, a supplier can
economize on its monitoring costs, allowing it to charge less for each service.
Likewise, the supplier can fashion a package of financial products
specifically designed for its customer’s individual needs and financial
position. For retail customers with modest investment goals, shopping
separately for bank, securities, and insurance products involves high
transactions costs. Moreover, the customer’s demand for each individual
financial product may be too small to interest many independent financial
services providers. In these cases, one-stop shopping for financial services,
even when mandated by the bank, is efficient for both supplier and
consumer.
Thus, convenience rather than coercion may explain many tying
arrangements, particularly “voluntary” ties. Policing voluntary ties has
proved particularly problematic: Bank regulators typically have viewed the
bank’s market power over the tying product and its success in selling the tied
product to its customer base as indicia of improper influence.128 Yet suc ss
in cross-marketing does not necessarily mean that customers have been
coerced. Customers may simply value convenience and familiarity over
diversity when choosing a financial services provider.
The bank regulators have recognized that not all tying arrangements are
coercive. For example, the Federal Reserve Board has permitted banking
organizations to offer a discount on fees for loans, deposits, and securities
brokerage services to customers who purchase a second product from the
bank.129 The Board noted that discounts would benefit consumers, who
would gain access to a greater variety of financial products. Moreover, rival
nonbank financial services providers were already offering similar discounts
125. See, e.g., Alabama Ass’n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 250 (5th Cir. 1976).
126. See id. at 249-50 (citing this argument made by National Association of Insurance Agents in
opposition to bank entry into insurance business).
127. See Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer
Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661 (1982).
128. See Alabama Ass’n of Ins. Agents, 533 F.2d at 250.
129. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.7(b)(1)(2) (1998).
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to their own customers.130
This ruling suggests that the bank regulators did not believe that the risk
of coercive tying by banks selling multiple financial products was so great as
to warrant holding banks to a higher legal standard than nonbank financial
firms. In fact, past evidence suggests that product tying in the marketing of
retail financial services has not been a pervasive problem. A study of private
litigation involving allegations of bank tying concluded that most claims
arose out of troubled lending relationships when the bank took steps to
improve its position as a creditor.131 Recent complaints about tying of
banking and securities products have come not from retail customers but
from corporations that complained that they were pressured to use their
lending bank to underwrite their securities offerings.132
Experience with antitying regulation offers some lessons for regulators
seeking to prevent blurring and other abuses in the cross-marketing of bank
and nonbank financial products. The new marketing restrictions, like
antitying regulation, may deter some unfair sales practices, but they may also
hurt retail customers if consumers are denied the convenience and cost
savings resulting from joint sales of financial products. Moreover, if banks
incur substantially higher compliance costs as they attempt to monitor the
sales practices of their employees, they may simply pass these costs onto
their retail consumers, destroying the economic benefit of one-stop shopping.
Monitoring costs are likely to be particularly high if banks must comply with
vague and subjective requirements, such as rules against blurring and
voluntary tying, violation of which depends on the perception and experience
of each individual customer. Moreover, policing compliance with these kinds
of rules may be just as difficult for financial regulators as it is for financial
company managers, a dilemma considered in Part III of this Essay.
III. THE COST OF REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION
The consumerization of financial regulation suggests a reshaped role for
the financial regulator as creator and enforcer of operating rules governing
transactions in retail markets. Although some financial regulators have
always performed this function, for some, including many bank regulators,
the role is new, and, for most, the detail and complexity of the new rules
130. See Revisions Regarding Tying Restrictions, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,473, 65,474 (1994).
131. See BERNARD SHULL, TYING AND OTHER CONDITIONAL AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 106
OF THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT: A RECONSIDERATION (National Econ. Research Assoc., Inc.
Working Paper No. 19, 1993).
132. See, e.g., Vicky Stamas & John Pryde, NationsBank May Have Violated ‘Anti-Tying’ Law,
Letter Shows, AM. BANKER, July 29, 1994, at 5.
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present new supervisory challenges. This raises two questions. First, which
regulatory body is the most efficient provider of the new consumer marketing
rules? Second, can any regulatory agency be expected to enforce these rules
effectively?
Consider again the rules governing the retail sale of nondeposit
investment products. The banking agencies’ guidelines cover bank securities
affiliates and third parties, such as independent broker-dealer firms, that
contract to sell securities products to bank customers on bank premises.133
Yet bank securities affiliates and independent broker-dealers are also subject
to regulation under the securities laws, and the National Association of
Securities Dealers has adopted its own rule governing retail sales of
nondeposit investment products on bank premises.134 State securities
regulators have also claimed authority to regulate some portion of these
sales.135
Is regulatory overlap inefficient? It may be inefficient if firms are
subjected to inconsistent standards. Bank and securities regulators have
attempted to harmonize their rules, requiring similar disclosures from all
sellers of investment products dealing with retail bank customers.
Nevertheless, discrepancies are inevitable whenever multiple regulators
assert authority.136
This problem may resolve itself if competition among regulators results in
the survival of the most efficient set of rules—and the most efficient
regulator. In theory, regulatory competition may eventually solve two
problems potentially affecting retail financial regulation: It may eliminate
inefficient overregulation and it may identify which regulatory agency is the
best provider of consumer rules. Nevertheless, competition to regulate retail
financial services markets may not be as efficient as other forms of
regulatory competition, such as competition for corporate charters. Effective
regulatory competition assumes that regulated entities can signal their
dissatisfaction with a regulatory regime by exiting and choosing a better
regulator. Yet exit is costly for financial firms; for example, firms that take
deposits are regulated as banks and cannot escape bank regulation without
133. See Interagency Statement, supra note 50, at 3-1579.51.
134. See NASD Rule 2350 Broker/Dealer Conduct on the Premises of Financial Institutions, 1997
NASD Notice to Members 89, 1997 NASD LEXIS 108.
135. See Stan Wilson, Bank Criticism Prompts NASAA To Revamp Model Bank Securities Sales
Rules, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 28, 1997, at 1. Retail sales of insurance products, traditionally
governed by state insurance law, are also likely to face dual regulation as banks and bank regulators
enter the field. See supra text accompanying note 54.
136. For example, the bank regulatory guidelines require that the mandatory disclosures be
repeated during every sales contact while NASD rule does not. Likewise, the NASD and the bank
regulators might adopt differing positions on issues such as the permissibility of referral fees paid to
tellers for locating potential securities customers.
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altering their charters and powers. And exit may be meaningless for
diversified firms that already are subject to multiple regulators.
Further, regulatory competition is complicated by differences in
enforcement styles and priorities among different financial regulatory
agencies. For example, securities regulators have argued that they should
supervise all financial firms, bank or nonbank, engaged in retail sales of
nondeposit investment products in order to ensure uniform enforcement.
Securities regulators have suggested that the bank supervisory scheme has
been too lax, lacking enforceable standards of conduct137 and is ouraging
private lawsuits by aggrieved consumers.138 Yet ecurities regulators have
evinced an intention to hold banks selling securities to higher standards than
nonbanks.139 This suggests that, if given a choice, banks will opt for bank
regulation and securities firms will opt for securities regulation. If uniformity
of regulatory application is the goal, then regulatory competition may not be
the best way to achieve it.
Finally, competition among regulatory agencies does not appear likely to
answer the empirical questions that arise with respect to retail financial
regulation. Are bank customers as a group more vulnerable to unfair sales
practices than other investors, and will they remain so even when one-stop
shopping for financial services becomes more common? Is disclosure the
best remedy, or should cross-marketing be regulated? Banks and their
customers can answer these questions more effectively than can federal
regulators, suggesting a role for some self-regulation to help fashion and
monitor the effectiveness of rules governing transactions with retail bank
customers. Although the banking industry has only limited experience with
self-regulation, this approach may be more efficient than the current “top-
down” imposition of federal consumer rules.140
137. See Prepared Statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Federal News Service, June 25,
1998, available in LEXIS, NEWS library, FEDNEW file [hereinafter Prepared Statement of Arthur
Levitt]. As previously noted, bank regulation of retail sales of nondeposit investment products
originally took the form of guidelines rather than rules. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
Although giving the guidelines formal rule status will facilitate their enforcement, the bank regulators
always had the power to treat violations as “unsafe and unsound” banking practices punishable
through regulatory enforcement action. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1994).
138. SEC Chairman Levitt has complained that most banking statutes do not give rise to private
rights of action for violation. See Prepared Statement of Arthur Levitt, supra note 137. Of course, not
all securities regulation gives rise to such rights. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th
Cir. 1980) (finding no private right of action for violation of NASD rule).
139. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (discussing securities regulators’ criticism of
bank’s use of organizational structure that is standard in brokerage industry).
140. One self-regulatory organization, the NASD, has already adopted a rule governing retail sales
of securities products to bank customers, and at least in the past, most banks have chosen to sell
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Self-regulation may also be necessary to guarantee effective enforcement.
If, as the bank regulators have recognized, large banking organizations have
difficulty monitoring compliance by their employees with detailed operating
rules such as mandatory disclosure during each sales presentation,141
monitoring costs are likely to be even higher for regulatory agencies that are
more remote from day-to-day sales operations than the bank’s own
management. As deregulation allows banks to diversify into new businesses,
growing institutional size and complexity will further complicate regulatory
oversight. Reliance on aggrieved customers to identify and report violations
of consumer rules is also inadequate. If bank customers are as
unsophisticated about the nature of bank and nonbank investment products as
the regulators apparently believe, they are likely to be unaware of their
bank’s obligations under federal bank and securities regulation. Therefore,
they are most likely to complain if and when they lose money on an
investment product marketed by a bank—which may be the first time that the
regulators (and perhaps senior bank management) become aware of past
violations.
Therefore, enforcement of detailed operating rules may require a
significant degree of voluntary compliance by the financial services industry
and its retail sales personnel. In the past, however, industry professionals
seemed ignorant of the rules. Surveys in 1995 and 1996 of retail sales of
nondeposit investment products to bank customers found that neither bank
employees nor representatives of registered broker-dealers routinely made
the disclosures required by bank regulation.142 Al hough a more recent
survey suggests improved compliance,143 mbiguities in current regulation,
such as identifying which customers are “retail”144 and how often disclosures
securities products through registered broker-dealers, affiliated or unaffiliated, many of whom are
already NASD members. See Prepared Testimony of Andrew C. Hove, Jr., Acting Chairman, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Before the House Commerce Comm. Finance and Hazardous
Materials Subcomm. on Financial Modernization, Federal News Service, July 17, 1997, available in
LEXIS, NEWS library, FEDNEW file [hereinafter Prepared Testimony of Andrew C. Hove]. So is the
NASD likely to emerge as the best regulator of retail financial markets? There may be some reluctance
on the part of banks and bank regulators to accept the authority of an organization identified with their
rival securities industry. This attitude may change, however, with time. For example, between 1931
and 1933, representatives of bank securities affiliates led the Investment Bankers Association of
America despite their relatively recent entrance into the securities business. See Edwin J. Perkins, The
Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 496 (1971).
141. See supra text accompanying note 107.
142. See Prepared Testimony of Andrew C. Hove, Jr., supra note 140 (citing survey).
143. See Steven Goldstein, Disclosure at Bank-Affiliated B/Ds, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
COMPLIANCE REP., Sept. 14, 1998, at 8 (finding that 76% of bank-affiliated brokers surveyed in 1997
disclosed that securities products were not FDIC-insured, 81% mentioned that securities were not
backed by bank deposits, and 92% discussed securities market risk with customers).
144. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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must be repeated,145 are likely to cause confusion, leading to violations.
Moreover, substantial voluntary compliance requires industry consensus
as to the legitimacy of regulation. In the case of the new consumer rules, the
absence of conclusive empirical evidence as to the efficacy of regulation may
discourage industry cooperation. Ironically, industry doubts may be fueled by
the willingness of the regulators to accept the argument that, in some cases,
compliance costs outweigh consumer benefits;146 if true in some cases, why
not in others? In addition, if the rules are interpreted so broadly that they
outlaw standard marketing practices in the industry or practices necessary for
successful diversification, then the regulators cannot count on widespread
industry cooperation.
CONCLUSION
Growing sentiment for financial deregulation reflects a consensus that
traditional legal rules designed to preserve safety and soundness are no
longer needed in modern financial markets, especially in markets in which
the players are sophisticated and can bargain for their own levels of
protection. Nevertheless, government involvement in financial markets
persists, shifting in focus as regulators are called upon to fashion new rules to
protect less sophisticated customers in retail financial markets.
This Essay has argued that the bifurcation of financial markets implied by
this shift in regulatory focus may prove to be unsustainable in the long run.
Retail financial markets may require less regulation than is currently assumed
in order to guarantee equal access to new investment opportunities to all
consumers. And wholesale financial markets may require more regulation in
order to guard against the growing danger of global market disruption.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 106-108.
146. See supra text accompanying note 110.
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